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Notes 
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE 
STATE ADOPTION OF INDEPENDENT 
REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS 
RYAN P. BATES 
INTRODUCTION 
The continuing antics of redistricting and re-redistricting 
following the 2000 census and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Vieth v. Jubelirer1 have again pushed the issue of gerrymandering of 
legislative and congressional districts into the public consciousness. 
Unlike the upheaval that followed the 1990 census,2 however, neither 
prominority nor promajority racial gerrymanders reemerged as the 
defining issue of the post-2000 redistricting cycle. Instead, the 
polarizing debate this time around has centered on the issue of the 
partisan gerrymander: the manipulation of a state redistricting 
process by a party or political faction to ensure that it will capture 
more than its “fair” share of the resulting districts in subsequent 
elections. The most egregious example of the decade thus far 
occurred in Texas. 
It was not until 2003 that the Texas legislature finally got serious 
about congressional redistricting. Although legislators had attempted 
to draw districts during the 2001 session, partisan deadlock prevented 
the adoption of a congressional redistricting plan, requiring a three-
 
Copyright © 2005 by Ryan P. Bates. 
 1. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 2. The issue of prominority racial gerrymandering reached the Supreme Court numerous 
times as a result of the 1990 redistricting cycle. E.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); 
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For a more comprehensive listing of the 
litigation inspired by the 1990 redistricting cycle, see National Conference of State Legislatures, 
Outline of Redistricting Litigation: The 1990s, http://www.senate.mn/departments/scr/redist/ 
redout.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) [hereinafter NCSL, 1990s Redistricting Litigation]. 
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judge federal district court to draw the plan used in the 2002 
congressional elections.3 Under this plan, which “applied neutral 
districting factors,” Texas elected seventeen Democratic and fifteen 
Republican congressional representatives.4 But following the 
Republican sweep of both houses of the Texas legislature and all 
major state executive offices,5 pressure from U.S. Representative 
Tom DeLay and other national Republican leaders to solidify the 
GOP margin in the U.S. House of Representatives propelled the 
Texas Republican leadership to revisit redistricting.6 A first attempt 
was stymied when the Texas House Democrats fled the state to deny 
the legislature a quorum until the regular session expired,7 forcing 
Governor Rick Perry to call special legislative sessions to pass the 
plan. In the first special session, Democrats invoked an informal 
Senate supermajority requirement to prevent adoption of a plan;8 in 
the second, the Senate Democrats fled the state, depriving the Senate 
the necessary two-thirds quorum.9 After a forty-five-day standoff, a 
Democratic state senator broke ranks and returned to Texas,10 
allowing Governor Perry to call a third special session. Only after the 
presiding officer changed the chamber’s cloture rule could the Senate 
pass redistricting legislation on a virtually party-line vote, with a lone 
West Texas Republican joining the Democrats in opposition.11 
 
 3. See generally Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01-CV-158, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25740 (E.D. 
Tex. Nov. 14, 2001) (ordering adoption of a court-drawn redistricting plan following the state 
legislature’s failure to adopt one), aff’d mem., 536 U.S. 919 (2002). 
 4. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (E.D. Tex. 2004), vacated sub nom. Jackson v. 
Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Juliet Eilperin, GOP’s New Push on Redistricting, WASH. POST, May 7, 2003, at A4; 
Editorial, Don’t Redraw Texas’ Congressional Districts, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 7, 
2003, at 6B. 
 7. Christy Hoppe & George Kuempel, Democrats Back, a Victory in Hand, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, May 17, 2003, at 1A. The flight prompted a national manhunt, involving 
federal resources at DeLay’s insistence. R.G. Ratcliffe & Karen Masterson, DeLay Admits to 
Role in Hunting for Democrats, HOUSTON CHRON., May 23, 2003, at 1A. 
 8. R.G. Ratcliffe, Death Knell Tolls for Redistricting—For Time Being, HOUSTON 
CHRON., July 26, 2003, at 1A. 
 9. Edmund Walsh, Texas Legislature Adjourns Special Session, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 
2003, at A4. 
 10. Robert T. Garrett, Democrat’s Return Could End Standoff, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Sept. 3, 2003, at 1A. 
 11. R.G. Ratcliffe & Janet Elliott, Senate OKs Redistrict Plan as GOP Feuds, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Sept. 24, 2003, at 1A. 
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The plan that Governor Perry signed into law12 sought to shift the 
partisan makeup of the Texas congressional delegation from 
seventeen to fifteen in favor of Democrats to twenty-one to eleven in 
favor of Republicans, mostly by taking deliberate aim at white 
Democratic incumbents.13 The legislative counsel to Republican 
Representative Joe Barton described it as “the most aggressive map I 
have ever seen. . . . This has a real national impact that should assure 
that Republicans keep the House no matter the national mood.”14 
The Nineteenth District, formerly drawn around Lubbock, now 
slithers eastward some three hundred miles.15 Metropolitan Austin, 
formerly a single district, was drawn and quartered—portions now 
belong to one district that reaches one hundred and fifty miles east to 
Houston and to two others that stretch more than three hundred 
miles south to the Mexican border,16 a configuration that has invited 
comparisons of South Texas with “a pinstripe suit.”17 But the 
distortions of the map were not simply geographic—for example, 
Representative Martin Frost, a Dallas Democrat reelected in 2002 
with 65 percent of the vote,18 was thrust into a new district with a 63 
percent Republican registration.19 Because Frost’s former district 
“simply disappear[ed],” most of his former constituents were shifted 
 
 12. The legality of this plan is currently being litigated and will be reviewed by the 
Supreme Court during the 2005 Term. See GI Forum of Tex. v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 829 (2005) 
(noting probable jurisdiction); Jackson v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 (2005) (same); League of United 
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 (2005) (same); Travis County, Tex. v. Perry, 126 
S. Ct. 829 (2005) (same). Given that the Court has already passed once on a post-Vieth 
opportunity to review the Texas re-redistricting, see Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004), 
vacating Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004), such a review seems unlikely to 
produce a result as unhelpful as Vieth and thus offers an opportunity for the Justices to bring 
some needed clarity to the jurisprudence. 
 13. See Editorial, The Soviet Republic of Texas, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2003, at A22 
(quoting Republican state Representative Phil King as stating that “[any Democrat] who is not 
in a minority district would have a very competitive race” (alteration in original)). 
 14. Edward Walsh, GOP Study Feeds Furor over Texas Redistricting, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 
2003, at A9. 
 15. Compare Plan 01151C—U.S. Congressional Districts, 108th Congress, 
http://gis1.tlc.state.tx.us/planc01151/default.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005), with Plan 01374C—
U.S. Congressional Districts, 109th Congress, http://gis1.tlc.state.tx.us/planc01374/default.htm 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2005). 
 16. Plan 01374C—U.S. Congressional Districts, 109th Congress, supra note 15. 
 17. The Soviet Republic of Texas, supra note 13, at A22. 
 18. Associated Press, U.S. House, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, Nov. 7, 2002, at 20A. 
 19. The Soviet Republic of Texas, supra note 13, at A22. 
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into two Republican-dominated districts and one preexisting 
majority-minority Democratic district.20 
The plan was successful in its main aims: four of the five 
Democratic incumbents targeted by the map were defeated, leaving 
the Texas delegation with the sought-after twenty-one to eleven 
Republican margin,21 and the map was successfully defended, at least 
initially, against charges of racial gerrymandering and minority vote 
dilution.22 
The saga of the Texas re-redistricting, though perhaps an outlier 
in its vituperative partisanship, its extraordinary drama, and its 
national media attention, was certainly not the only gerrymander of 
the 2000 redistricting cycle. But as a parable illustrating the many 
harms engendered by partisan gerrymandering, it is without peer. The 
political harms inflicted by the re-redistricting are plain: ruination of 
the bipartisan tradition in the Texas legislature; inaccurate 
representation of voters’ aggregate preferences at both the statewide 
and national levels; months-long hijacking of the state legislative 
agenda, preventing consideration of programs crucial to many 
Texans; millions of dollars spent on three special legislative sessions; 
and violence to traditional notions of proper redistricting, such as 
district compactness and the decennial cycle itself. Arguably 
constitutional harms are also apparent, if one takes the trouble to 
look for them: the “expressive harm”23 of governmental classification 
according to one’s party affiliation or voting record; the dilution of a 
political bloc vote, which fortuitously provided cover for what was in 
reality a significant dilution of aggregate racial-minority voting 
 
 20. See Walsh, supra note 14, at A9 (quoting analysis by the legislative counsel to U.S. 
Representative Joe Barton concerning the redistricting plan’s effect on Representative Frost’s 
district). 
 21. Robert T. Garrett, One Democrat Survives Redistricting, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, 
Nov. 4, 2004, at 23A. The six-seat gain in Texas was instrumental in the overall Republican 
addition of five seats to their majority in the U.S. House of Representatives. See Charles 
Babington & Juliet Eilperin, GOP Hopes to Expand Its Majority, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2004, at 
A17. 
 22. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 481, 486, 496, 513 (E.D. Tex. 2004), vacated sub 
nom Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004). 
 23. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and 
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
483, 506–07 (1993) (defining expressive harms as those “result[ing] from the ideas or attitudes 
expressed through a governmental action”). 
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strength;24 and the chilling of the intradistrict political competition 
necessary to responsive and accountable representation. 
But as critical as what can be found is what cannot be: violations 
of the equal protection standards for evaluating partisan 
gerrymanders announced in Davis v. Bandemer.25 Although there was 
plainly “intentional discrimination against an identifiable political 
group,”26 one looks in vain for “evidence of continued frustration of 
the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of 
voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.”27 However 
unwarranted in procedure or in outcome, it is almost certainly 
impossible to prove that the Texas re-redistricting “will consistently 
degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political 
process as a whole.”28 Yet if this ne plus ultra of partisan 
gerrymanders does not violate the standards announced in Bandemer, 
it is difficult to imagine that any real-world instance of 
gerrymandering ever would. Because such a showing is too 
burdensome for any litigant to make, Bandemer has become, for all 
intents and purposes, a nullity, a quaint historical oddity of no 
prescriptive force. 
The difficulty, as courts have consistently found in the years since 
Bandemer, is in defining an operative standard to measure “fairness” 
in this context: “The key problem is that there is ultimately no real 
conception [within the judiciary] of what a properly functioning 
electoral system looks like and, not surprisingly, no real conception of 
what is the precise harm to be remedied.”29 Responding to lower 
courts’ inability to solve this dilemma, the Vieth v. Jubelirer plurality 
 
 24.  The view that Plan 01374C was retrogressive in terms of minority voting strength was 
unanimously shared by the staff attorneys in the Civil Rights Divison of the Department of 
Justice charged with preclearance of the Texas redistricting plan under Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act.  Dan Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, 
at A1. 
 25. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). Following the failure of existing ex ante procedural controls such 
as decennial redistricting and the one-person, one-vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 568 (1964), to address partisan gerrymandering successfully, Bandemer announced that, in 
principle, courts would evaluate claims of partisan gerrymandering against a substantive 
standard of fairness rooted in ex post evaluations of the fairness of electoral outcomes relative 
to the political preferences of the relevant population, 478 U.S. at 132–33 (plurality opinion). 
 26. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion). 
 27. Id. at 133. 
 28. Id. at 132. 
 29. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 611 
(2002). 
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advocated overturning Bandemer and returning the issue to the 
political branches.30 Though Justice Kennedy’s dispositive 
concurrence refused to return to the view that partisan gerrymanders 
are nonjusticiable political questions, it nonetheless rejected every 
plausible yardstick for measuring allegations of constitutional harm.31 
Already doubtful under Bandemer, judicial relief for those injured by 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders32 thus seems increasingly 
unlikely after Vieth. 
This Note argues that, following Justice Scalia’s invitation in 
Vieth for the political branches to address the problems of political 
gerrymandering,33 Congress would be both authorized and justified in 
requiring the states to adopt independent and nonpartisan 
commissions as the primary mechanism for performing the (normally) 
decennial redistricting process, both for congressional and state 
legislative districts. Whether or not the Supreme Court continues to 
evade its responsibility to protect political minorities from structural 
oppression through redistricting, Congress retains both remedial and 
prophylactic authority to address the constitutional harm that 
Bandemer recognized in partisan gerrymanders. 
As this Note and other scholarship suggest, independent 
redistricting commissions are an enticing policy option for addressing 
this harm. These commissions can temper excessive partisanship and 
self-dealing by distancing legislators from the redistricting process, 
without completely eliding the important political nature of the 
process. Certainly, independent redistricting commissions are not 
guaranteed to achieve the elusive—likely impossible—ideal of 
 
 30. 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 31. See id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (dismissing the case for failure to state a valid 
claim because there was no standard with which to measure the alleged burden on plaintiffs’ 
rights). 
 32. Vieth’s reconsideration of whether partisan gerrymanders fall under the political 
question doctrine is rooted in the lack of a judicially manageable standard for evaluating these 
claims, not in the absence of a constitutional injury. Despite the abstract debate over the 
justiciability of the issue, there is little question that, at least as a theoretical matter, sufficiently 
egregious partisan gerrymandering can give rise to constitutional claims. See id. at 292 (plurality 
opinion) (stating that “[w]e do not disagree with [the] judgment” that “severe partisan 
gerrymanders [are incompatible] with democratic principles”); id. at 311–12 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“Allegations of unconstitutional bias in apportionment are most serious 
claims . . . .”). 
 33. See id. at 275–76, 277 n.4 (“[T]he Framers provided a remedy for [gerrymandered 
districts] in the Constitution. . . . The power bestowed on Congress to regulate elections, and in 
particular to restrain the practice of political gerrymandering, has not lain dormant.”). 
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balancing competitiveness, responsiveness, proportionality, interest-
group representation, preservation of political subdivisions, 
contiguity, compactness, and the many other desired characteristics 
when drawing district lines. Yet they may represent the best solution 
available under the current legal framework. 
In framing this argument, this Note first surveys federal courts’ 
interventions against partisan gerrymanders and their concomitant 
failure to develop either a concept of the constitutional harm or a 
manageable standard of review, suggesting the need for legislative 
relief in the face of judicial inaction. The existing models of 
redistricting commissions, as implemented by several states, are then 
considered, along with their efficacy in relieving the evils of 
redistricting by self-interested legislators. Finally, this Note proposes 
that congressional action requiring all states to adopt a proven model 
for such redistricting commissions is not only warranted, but is 
constitutionally permissible, both as to congressional and state 
legislative districts. 
I.  INTO THE POLITICAL THICKET—JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO 
GERRYMANDERING 
Prior to 1962, challenges to the malapportionment of 
congressional and state legislative districts were held nonjusticiable 
by federal courts, a position typically justified by invocations of the 
political question doctrine, concerns over administrable remedies and 
courts’ competence to implement them, and observations that the 
political branches of government, notably Congress, provided more 
appropriate forums in which to seek relief.34 Baker v. Carr35 
established for the first time that malapportionment denying equal 
protection—what one scholar has described as “the right of the 
individual citizen to approach the ballot box on an equal footing with 
each other citizen”36—presented a justiciable constitutional claim.37 
This decision sparked a revolution in reapportionment across the 
 
 34. E.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552–56 (1946). 
 35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 36. Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political 
Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1648 (1993). 
 37. Baker, 369 U.S. at 237. 
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nation,38 but it was not until Reynolds v. Sims,39 two years later, that 
the Court settled on a substantive standard under the Equal 
Protection Clause by which to evaluate apportionment: one person, 
one vote.40 As the bedrock principle for “achieving . . . fair and 
effective representation for all citizens,”41 one-person, one-vote 
provided an objective, readily manageable standard by which claims 
could be measured. It was initially thought that such a powerful and 
wide-ranging principle could counteract all forms of district 
manipulation—including partisan gerrymandering42—in which 
“neither history . . . nor economic or other sorts of group interests, 
are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from 
population-based representation.”43 
Within two decades, the optimistic belief that one-person, one-
vote would successfully deter partisan gerrymanders had been 
definitively refuted. Despite the increasingly rigid requirement of 
equipopulous congressional districts,44 creative cartography and 
sophisticated analytical tools allowed legislatures to continue their 
manipulation of census data to craft districts of bizarre shapes, thus 
skewing electoral outcomes but nonetheless not running afoul of the 
Court’s equal protection criteria. The nadir came in New Jersey: in 
Karcher v. Daggett,45 the Court sidestepped an opportunity to address 
a blatant gerrymander directly,46 instead invalidating the redistricting 
 
 38. See Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1647–48, 1648  n.25 (“[In Baker and Reynolds, t]he 
Court cast aside the established means of political business in virtually every state in the 
country . . . .”). 
 39. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 40. See id. at 568 (“[A]n individual’s right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally 
impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens 
living [i]n other parts of the State.”); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) 
(requiring one-person, one-vote for congressional districts on a parallel theory rooted in Article 
I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution). 
 41. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565–66. 
 42. See id. at 578–79 (“Indiscriminate districting . . . may be little more than an open 
invitation to partisan gerrymandering.”). 
 43. Id. at 579–80. 
 44. See Kirkpatrick v. Preiser, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969) (requiring that congressional 
apportionments reflect “a good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality” and 
rejecting de minimis variations as detracting from the goals of equal protection). A more 
generous standard was applied to state legislative districts, presuming the constitutionality of 
districting plans with maximum deviations from population equality no greater than ten percent. 
Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983). 
 45. 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
 46. Id. at 764–65 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE 
LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 181 (rev. 2d ed. 2002) 
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plan on the basis of a maximum deviation from equality that was less 
than the margin of error for the census data itself.47 One-person, one-
vote had, essentially by virtue of its administrability alone,48 ceased to 
be the means and become the end itself. Rather than serving as one 
measure of conformance with the constitutional commands of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it served to further insulate sophisticated 
gerrymanders from equal protection challenges.49 
By recognizing an equal protection claim against partisan 
gerrymandering independent of equipopulation deviations, Davis v. 
Bandemer50 sought to correct this failing. However, although a 
majority determined that such claims were justiciable,51 only a four-
Justice plurality agreed upon a substantive standard for adjudicating 
them: “intentional discrimination against an identifiable political 
group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”52 Though 
intent could be easily proven in the redistricting context,53 the 
plurality set forth a discriminatory-effect test substantially more 
difficult to satisfy: 
[U]nconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral 
system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a 
voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a 
whole. 
 . . . [A]n equal protection violation may be found only where 
the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in 
their opportunity to influence the political process effectively. . . . 
[S]uch a finding of unconstitutionality must be supported by 
evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the 
 
(“The clear import of Karcher was a confrontation with a Democratic Party gerrymander that 
resulted in what was aptly termed ‘a flight of cartographic fancy.’”). 
 47. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 735 (plurality opinion). 
 48. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121 (1980) (suggesting that one-
person, one-vote’s “administrability is its long suit, and the more troublesome question is what 
else it has to recommend it”). 
 49. See Issacharoff, supra note 36, at 1654–55 (“The legacy of Reynolds became, in effect, a 
shield against substantive challenges to partisan manipulations so long as the ensuing districting 
schemes satisfied the narrow commands of one-person, one-vote.”). 
 50. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 51. Id. at 125. 
 52. Id. at 127 (plurality opinion). 
 53. Id. at 129. 
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voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to 
influence the political process.54 
However, only two Justices, evaluating the substantive claim under a 
different standard,55 voted to uphold the finding of an equal 
protection violation.56 
The disposition in Bandemer set the pattern for the next eighteen 
years.57 During that time, only a single case, Republican Party of 
North Carolina v. Martin, was found to violate the Bandemer 
plurality’s standard,58 no administrable substantive standard emerged 
from lower-court consideration of partisan gerrymandering claims,59 
and virtually all such claims were dismissed, including many 
fundamentally factually indistinguishable from Martin.60 So it was that 
the Court’s decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer61 was eagerly anticipated as 
an opportunity to correct the failings of Bandemer, one way or 
another.62 
As with much in life, anticipation was surely better than reality. 
Rather than offering some degree of doctrinal clarity, whether a 
definitive finding of nonjusticiability or a reformulated substantive 
standard for adjudicating claims, Vieth achieved an incoherence that 
made Bandemer seem comparatively clear. Bringing the discussion of 
judicial cognizance of the constitutional harm full-circle, the plurality 
concluded that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable, 
 
 54. Id. at 132–33. 
 55. Id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (advocating a multi-
factor balancing test). Justice Stevens joined Powell’s opinion. 
 56. Id. at 184. 
 57. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Bandemer has 
served almost exclusively as an invitation to litigation without much prospect of redress.” 
(quoting SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 886 (rev. 2d ed. 2002))). 
 58. See 980 F.2d 943, 958 (4th Cir. 1992) (challenging the method by which North Carolina 
elected superior court judges). 
 59. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 280 (plurality opinion) (“To think that this lower-court 
jurisprudence has brought forth ‘judicially discernible and manageable standards’ would be 
fantasy.”). 
 60. See id. at 279–80, 280 n.6 (citing numerous cases in which “districting plans . . . were 
upheld despite allegations of extreme partisan discrimination, bizarrely shaped districts, and 
disproportionate results”). 
 61. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 62. See Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan 
Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 626 (2004) (observing the 
improbability that the Court would accept the case merely to reaffirm Bandemer and noting the 
expectation that Vieth would either overrule Bandemer or replace its substantive standard). 
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relying upon invocations of the political question doctrine, concerns 
over administrable remedies and courts’ competence to implement 
them, and observations that the political branches of government, 
notably Congress, provided more appropriate forums in which to seek 
relief.63 But with five Justices voting to retain Bandemer, the hopes of 
Tom DeLay, constitutional originalists, and yet another generation of 
law students struggling to understand “the law of democracy” were 
dashed:64 constitutional challenges to redistricting plans remain 
justiciable.65 The troubling part, however, is that whereas such 
challenges were previously understood as equal protection claims 
grounded in intentional discrimination and discriminatory effect,66 it is 
no longer clear upon which constitutional grounds these challenges 
must now rest. 
The Vieth dissenters, seeking to preserve the justiciability of 
partisan gerrymandering claims while refining the Bandemer 
conception of the equal protection harm, offered a broad array of 
potential replacements.67 Justice Kennedy, writing the dispositive 
concurrence, rejected all of these proposals, as well as the standard 
utilized since Bandemer for measuring the constitutional harm, as 
“either unmanageable or inconsistent with precedent, or both.”68 On 
 
 63. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277–81 (plurality opinion); see also supra note 34 and accompanying 
text. 
 64. Cf. Hasen, supra note 62, at 627. See generally ISSACHAROFF, supra note 46. 
 65. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 317 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 66. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
 67. Justice Stevens suggested that governmental discrimination in redistricting that 
burdened First Amendment associational rights could be analyzed under the discernible and 
manageable standards offered by political patronage cases. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 323–25 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also advanced the idea that partisan gerrymanders propagate a 
“representational harm” in the same manner as do racial gerrymanders, id. at 330, an interesting 
position given his vociferous opposition to such a conception of the harm in Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630, 678 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter and Ginsburg, opting for a vote 
dilution model, propounded a five-step test for a potential plaintiff to make out a prima facie 
case, which the state could then rebut. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 346–51 (Souter, J., dissenting). One of 
the threshold showings would be a correlation between the challenged district’s deviations from 
traditional districting principles and the population distribution of the group allegedly 
discriminated against, id. at 349, something like a poor man’s version of the ecological 
regression analysis used to demonstrate racial bloc voting and its effect on districting choices in 
the racial gerrymandering cases. Justice Breyer similarly conceived the harm as vote dilution 
leading to unjustified entrenchment: “a situation in which a party that enjoys only minority 
support among the populace has nonetheless contrived to take, and hold, legislative power.” Id. 
at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 68. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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the other hand, he refused to “bar all future claims of injury from a 
partisan gerrymander.”69 Instead, Justice Kennedy speculated that 
administrable standards might emerge from voters’ First Amendment 
rights against being penalized for their expression of political views or 
their association with a political party.70 Yet this line of inquiry led 
nowhere, given that finding that a partisan gerrymander burdens a 
plaintiff’s representational rights in violation of the First Amendment 
would “depend[] first on courts’ having available a manageable 
standard by which to measure the effect of the apportionment.”71 This 
stopping point is identical in terms of the political question doctrine 
to that reached under an equal protection analysis—once one rejects 
vote dilution, improper motive, expressive harms, and conflicts of 
interest as mechanisms for measuring a First Amendment claim, as 
Justice Kennedy has, one has reached yet another doctrinal dead 
end.72 
Although Vieth may be readily interpreted as a signal that 
federal courts are unavailable to those seeking redress against 
partisan gerrymanders,73 the Court has since muddied the picture 
even further. After a three-judge district court declared that the 
Texas re-redistricting was not a partisan gerrymander under 
Bandemer’s high standard of proof,74 the Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Vieth.75 Perhaps the 
course of the Texas re-redistricting was sufficiently egregious to 
garner five votes for some form of ex ante review of redistricting 
 
 69. Id. at 309. 
 70. Id. at 314. 
 71. Id. at 315. 
 72. See Hasen, supra note 62, at 634 (“[T]here likely is no partisan gerrymandering 
standard that can simultaneously meet all of Justice Kennedy’s requirements; what remains is a 
null set.”); id. at 637 (“In short, there is nothing left as a test for partisan gerrymandering under 
Justice Kennedy’s three requirements. We are at a dead end.”). Perhaps this outcome was 
intended—that, until a broader social consensus emerges as to the nature and degree of harm 
posed by partisan gerrymanders, the Court will not settle upon a conception of the 
constitutional harm and standards for recognizing and remedying it. In the meantime, however, 
doctrinal foundations recede ever further into the murk. 
 73. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305 (plurality opinion) (inviting lower courts to treat Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion “as a reluctant fifth vote against justiciability”). 
 74. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 474 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
 75. Jackson v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004), remanded to Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 
756 (E.D. Tex. 2005). Reading the tea leaves of a vacation-and-remand order is a risky business. 
All that can definitively be said is that the Court found Vieth to be “sufficiently analogous and, 
perhaps, decisive to compel reexamination of [Session].” Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 
776, 777 (1964). 
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plans based on the redistricting procedures themselves, leaving aside 
the tougher questions of reviewing the fairness of electoral 
outcomes.76 The question whether procedural irregularities in the 
Texas re-redistricting could be sufficient in themselves to justify 
overturning a legislatively adopted plan might explain the Supreme 
Court’s decision to hear appeals in four cases challenging Texas’ 
current districts.77 Though such an interpretation is consistent with 
some of the questions presented in those cases, however, the number 
and variety of questions presented makes it difficult to draw 
inferences about where the Justices’ interests in these cases lie.78 In 
any case, these challenges provide another chance for the Justices to 
consider standards of procedural or substantive fairness by which to 
adjudicate partisan gerrymanders, and it is hoped that they will seize 
the opportunity. Until they do so, whether in Jackson and its 
companion cases or in response to some future partisan gerrymander, 
it is clear that Justice Scalia’s question criticizing Vieth’s disposition—
 
 76. The puzzling Session remand came on October 18, 2004, two weeks before the map at 
issue was used in Texas congressional elections, Jackson, 534 U.S. at 941; thus, any disposition 
other than dismissal for failure to state a claim or nonjusticiability would imply a shift from the 
outcome-reviewing standards accepted under Bandemer and discussed in Vieth. 
 77. See GI Forum of Tex. v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 829 (2005) (noting probable jurisdiction); 
Jackson v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 (2005) (same); League of United Latin American Citizens 
(LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 (2005) (same); Travis County, Tex. v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 827 
(2005) (same). 
 78. The ten questions presented by the four cases range from issues of procedural and 
substantive fairness in defining unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders under Bandemer and 
Vieth to the requirements for modifying majority-minority districts under Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act and relevant Supreme Court precedents on racial gerrymandering. Most 
relevant to the concerns discussed here are questions raised in Travis County, Jackson, and 
LULAC concerning partisan motivation and the validity of using decennial census data in 
shaping a mid-decade redistricting plan. See Questions Presented in Jackson v. Perry (No. 05-
276), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00276qp.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) (“Whether 
the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment prohibit States from redrawing lawful 
districting plans in the middle of the decade, for the sole purpose of maximizing partisan 
advantage.”); Questions Presented in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (No. 
05-204), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00204qp.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) 
(“Whether the 2003 . . . [redistricting plan], adopted and developed using outdated, inaccurate 
2000 Census data . . . , in violation of one person, one vote when measured against 2003 Census 
data, and when ‘the single-minded purpose . . . was to gain partisan advantage’ and when such 
purpose is realized, is an unconstitutional political gerrymander.”); Questions Presented in 
Travis County, Texas v. Perry (No. 05-254), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/05-00254qp.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2005) (“Does the Texas legislature’s 2003 replacement of a legally valid 
congressional districting plan with a statewide plan, enacted for ‘the singleminded purpose’ of 
gaining partisan advantage, satisfy the stringent constitutional rule of equipopulous districts by 
relying on the 2000 decennial census and the fiction of inter-censal population accuracy?”).  
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“What are the lower courts to make of this pronouncement?”79—
remains unanswered. 
II.  THE POLITICAL THICKET REDUX—LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO 
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS 
States, however, have not been quiescent in the absence of 
judicial intervention against partisan gerrymanders. Their primary 
response has been the expansion of the role of nonlegislative bodies 
in the redistricting process, particularly independent redistricting 
commissions.80 This Part first explores the varieties of commissions 
that have been implemented and then gives particular attention to the 
potential benefits of the tie-breaker commission model. Its relative 
merits are considered, and the systemic issues which prevent wider 
state adoption of redistricting commissions are then discussed. 
A. The Common Forms of Independent Redistricting Commissions 
Currently, slightly fewer than half of the states utilize some form 
of independent commission in the process of redistricting 
congressional or state legislative districts.81 Although there are wide 
variations in these commissions’ forms,82 the most important variables 
are the commissions’ responsibility for the redistricting process and 
their membership structures.83 
 
 79. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305. 
 80. In the taxonomy of this Note, the term “independent redistricting commission” denotes 
a body separate from the state legislature with some role in the state’s redistricting process. 
Each of the variations on this general theme discussed infra, such as primary bipartisan 
commissions or backup blue-ribbon commissions, is a subspecies of this genus. 
 81. As of this writing, twenty-three states have implemented some form of this institution. 
See sources cited infra notes 84, 87, 89. 
 82. See Christopher C. Confer, Note, To Be About the People’s Business: An Examination 
of the Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 115, 119–23 (2003) (describing the variability of structurally significant features of 
state legislative redistricting commissions); Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting 
Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837, 841–51 (1997) (same). 
 83. A third difference, less critical for the argument of this Note, is the scope of 
commission authority. In the majority of states implementing any form of redistricting 
commission, their function is limited to defining state legislative districts, leaving congressional 
redistricting to the state legislatures. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI; ARK. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1–4; 
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. 
XIII, § 254; MO. CONST. art. III, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A; 
ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 6; PA. CONST. art. II, § 17; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. III, 
§ 28. Only a minority employ commissions to define both congressional and state legislative 
districts. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 2(1); CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b); HAW. CONST. art. IV,  
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The first key differentiator among the various forms is a 
commission’s degree of responsibility in the redistricting process. The 
states have thus far implemented three models: primary, backup, and 
advisory. The primary commission, the most common form,84 has the 
initial responsibility for drawing up district maps and is generally 
tasked with beginning and completing the redistricting process within 
a specified period following the availability of federal census data.85 
The many states implementing the primary commission model also 
vary in the degree of legislative oversight imposed on the 
commissions.86 In contrast to the primary commission model, the less-
 
§ 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3 (Maine legislative districting); 
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2 (congressional redistricting); id. art. IV, § 3 
(state legislative redistricting); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43; IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.3 (West 
1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 21-A, § 1206(1) (West Supp. 2004) (Maine congressional 
districting). No state commission is responsible for congressional, but not state legislative, 
redistricting. 
Removing state legislative districting from the hands of state legislators eliminates, at 
least in theory, conflicts of interest in that branch of the redistricting process. However, their 
retention of control over congressional redistricting permits self-interested political 
maneuvering both by ambitious state legislators seeking to move up the political food chain and 
by current members of Congress, as Representative DeLay’s involvement in the Texas re-
redistricting demonstrates. Although there is no guarantee that backroom political maneuvering 
does not also affect independent redistricting commissions, the formal independence of such 
bodies from legislatures, coupled in many cases with membership selection mechanisms 
designed to foster political parity and defuse political incentives, provide structural impediments 
to subversion of the commissions’ independence. Thus, unless specifically noted otherwise, this 
Note’s argument is intended to span both congressional and state legislative redistricting. 
 84. Fifteen states use the primary commission model, though they vary in other important 
respects. ALASKA CONST. art. VI; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. VIII,  
§§ 1–4; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; ME. 
CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MO. CONST. art. III, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. 
V, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2 (congressional redistricting); id. art. IV, § 3 (state legislative 
redistricting); OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; PA. CONST. art. II, § 17; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43; 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.3 (West 1999). 
 85. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. III, § 2 (requiring the first meeting of the redistricting 
commission within fifteen days of the final member’s appointment, the filing of a tentative 
redistricting plan within five months, and the filing of a final plan within six months); see also 
National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting Law 2000, app. E (Redistricting 
Commissions: Legislative Plans), http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/ 
red2000/apecomsn.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) [hereinafter NCSL, Redistricting 
Commissions] (aggregating, with some omissions, information on redistricting commissions for 
state legislative districts, including requirements of formation dates and initial and final 
deadlines for plan submission). 
 86. Among those states implementing the primary commission model, there is some 
variation on the degree of institutionalized oversight of the plans developed by the commission. 
The plans of the vast majority of these states’ commissions become law with no judicial or 
legislative approval. E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VI; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1; ARK. CONST. 
art. VIII; HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6; MO. 
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common backup commission87 only takes responsibility for 
redistricting following the failure of the state legislature to fulfill its 
duty as the primary drafting body for a redistricting plan.88 Finally, in 
the rare advisory model,89 the commission provides nonbinding advice 
to the legislature during the redistricting process.90 
The second fundamental attribute of these commissions, and the 
one most determinative of the “nonpartisan” nature of the 
commission’s work and results,91 is the mechanism by which their 
membership is determined.92 Although there are minor variations 
 
CONST. art. III, § 2; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2 (congressional 
redistricting); id. art. IV, § 3 (state legislative redistricting); OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; PA. 
CONST. art. II, § 17. However, four states restrict the independence of their commissions by 
either allowing or requiring intervention by the state judicial or legislative branches. Iowa 
requires direct legislative approval of commission plans and allows the legislature to take over 
the task of drafting the plan if three successive commission plans are rejected. IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 42.3 (West 1999). Maine similarly requires legislative approval or amendment, by a two-
thirds vote, but grants the state Supreme Judicial Court authority to draft plans if the legislature 
fails to meet the supermajority threshold. ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3. Washington does not 
require legislative approval for commission plans to take effect, but the legislature may amend 
such plans by a two-thirds vote. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(7). Finally, Colorado requires 
commission plans to be approved by the state supreme court, rather than by its legislature. 
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48(1)(e). Such forms of oversight, by providing opportunities for 
political actors to intervene in the otherwise independent process, represent a value judgment 
that the input of elected officials responsible to their constituents remains an important check 
upon the redistricting commission. 
 87. Seven states use the backup commission model. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b); ILL. 
CONST. art. IV, § 3(b); MISS. CONST. art. XIII, § 254; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A; ORE. CONST. 
art. IV, § 6 (vesting authority in the state supreme court); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5 (same); TEX. 
CONST. art. III, § 28. 
 88. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A (providing that a commission shall reapportion 
state legislative districts if the legislature “fail[s] or refuse[s] to make such apportionment within 
the time provided”); see also NCSL, Redistricting Commissions, supra note 85 (detailing, with 
omissions, requirements of formation dates and final deadlines for backup commissions). 
 89. Vermont uses this model exclusively. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 73. Connecticut also utilizes 
an advisory commission, distinct from its backup commission. CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(a). 
 90. Because the recommendations of advisory commissions require legislative 
implementation, such commissions are fundamentally dependent on state legislatures in a 
manner distinct from the other two models. As they therefore provide no opportunity for 
reduction of partisan political influence in the redistricting process, they will not be considered 
further here. 
 91. It is neither reasonably expected nor necessarily desirable that all partisan competition 
be removed from the redistricting process by a procedural or institution-selecting control on the 
process. The aim is instead to keep partisanship within an acceptable range, a purely normative 
goal. See infra text accompanying notes 109–10. 
 92. A secondary consideration in the membership selection mechanism is whether service 
on a redistricting commission should prevent members from seeking public office for a future 
period, either in the body for which redistricting was performed or for any major office in the 
state. Both measures have the effect of discouraging and preventing conflicts of interest and 
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among the states, three models have dominated: bipartisan, blue-
ribbon, and tie-breaker panels. In addition, the Iowa model presents a 
unique approach to determining commission membership. 
Numerically, and perhaps functionally, the most inferior option is 
the bipartisan panel, in which equal numbers of commission members 
are affiliated with one of the two major political parties.93 Although 
the potential for deadlock on such panels is obvious,94 bipartisanship 
can also serve as an impetus to craft a plan favorable to both parties’ 
interests in stability and retention of incumbent representatives, when 
the alternative is a plan drawn in a judicial proceeding which might 
serve other popular interests. This outcome, of course, is not 
especially congruent with the vision of the independent redistricting 
commission as an antigerrymandering device; a bipartisan 
gerrymander is a plausible and undesirable outcome of such panels.95 
 
self-dealing in the redistricting process. Four states enforce versions of both restrictions. 
ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(a), (c); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3), (13); IDAHO CONST. art. 
III, § 2(2), (6); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 6. Three states only disqualify commission members 
from some offices for a future period. HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; MO. CONST. art. III, § 2; N.J. 
CONST. art. II, § 2(1)(a) (congressional redistricting commission only). Three states restrict 
current or recent officeholders from commission membership. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14(2); 
PA. CONST. art. II, § 17(b) (commission chair only); WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(3). Naturally, 
only states with bipartisan or tie-breaker membership models have adopted either restriction. 
 93. Four states implement a pure bipartisan model. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2; MICH. 
CONST. art. IV, § 6; MO. CONST. art. III, § 2; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43. 
 94. See Kubin, supra note 82, at 847 & n.51 (noting that, through the 1990 round of 
redistricting, Michigan’s bipartisan commission had consistently failed to adopt a redistricting 
plan). 
 95. For example, in the 1970 redistricting cycle, the Connecticut redistricting commission 
generated a bipartisan gerrymander that was eventually challenged in the Supreme Court. 
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (upholding the Connecticut gerrymander and 
observing that “judicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State purports fairly to 
allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within quite 
tolerable limits, succeeds in doing so”). Professor Samuel Issacharoff, among others, has 
roundly criticized Gaffney’s acceptance of bipartisan gerrymandering as limiting the conception 
of constitutional harm to “some notion of unfair conduct directed at one or the other of the 
major parties” rather than protecting voter welfare by ensuring competitiveness within a vibrant 
“political market.” Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 612–17. But see Nathaniel Persily, Reply, In 
Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-
Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 676 (2002) (“Gaffney does not demonstrate 
the problem of self-interested political manipulation or the need for aggressive judicial relief. If 
anything, [it] serves as a warning to those who would presume that judges are inherently 
different from politicians in the motivations underlying their redistricting decisions or that 
‘nonpartisan’ redistricting necessarily fosters competition.”). 
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More popular,96 but less auspicious for reducing partisanship in 
the redistricting process, is the blue-ribbon panel; the numerous 
variations on this model employ high-ranking state officers as 
members of the redistricting commission without regard to any 
balance of partisan affiliation. The obvious risk of this model is its 
potential for concentrating, rather than diluting, the partisanship of 
the redistricting process, because there is no guarantee of 
representation for opposing viewpoints. In Texas, for instance, 
membership on the backup commission is conferred directly on 
specific state offices.97 During the 2003 re-redistricting, had the 
commission become involved, its entirely Republican membership98 
would have been unlikely to come to a result significantly different 
from that of the state legislature. The potential for such one-sidedness 
in commission membership, particularly involving actors who are 
simultaneously engaged in the state political process, raises 
fundamental questions about the fairness of this model. The blue-
ribbon variant employed in Oregon, in which the secretary of state is 
the sole commission member,99 even further undermines diversity of 
viewpoints and enhances the potential for partisanship to 
predominate. 
The theoretically most sound, and numerically most common, of 
the membership models is the tie-breaker commission.100 Under this 
model, an even number of membership slots are equally divided 
between the two major parties, often with members chosen by the 
majority and minority leaders of the state legislature, and an 
ostensibly neutral tie-breaking member is chosen, typically by 
majority vote of the commission membership.101 This design promotes 
 
 96. This model is employed by eight states. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 4; ARK. CONST. art. 
VIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. XIII, § 254; OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 11A; 
ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 6; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28. 
 97. See TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28 (naming the lieutenant governor, the speaker of the 
House, the attorney general, the state comptroller, and the land commissioner to the backup 
redistricting commission). 
 98. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 458 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
 99. ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 6. 
 100. Nine states use tie-breaker commissions. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(3);  
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 48; CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(b); HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2; ILL.  
CONST. art. IV, § 3; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 14; N.J. CONST.  
art. II, § 2 (congressional redistricting); id. art. IV, § 3 (state legislative redistricting); PA. 
CONST. art. II, § 17. 
 101. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (providing that the president of the state senate, the 
speaker of the state house, and designees of the minority leadership of each chamber shall each 
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bipartisan cooperation and discourages stonewalling. Though 
incentives for bipartisan gerrymandering are not eliminated, they are 
weaker than in the pure bipartisan model: where the deciding vote is 
cast by an ostensibly neutral participant, each side is likely to court 
that vote by proposing a plan that ensures competition. The political 
cost of doing so is likely lower, all other things equal, than the cost of 
creating a competition-free bipartisan gerrymander that attracts one 
or more votes from the partisan opposition.102 Despite academic 
grumblings over the difficulties inherent in finding a Platonic 
philosopher-king to undertake the chairmanship,103 the tie-breaker 
commission, through structural checks and balances, presents the best 
opportunity to reduce the degree of partisanship while preserving the 
benefits of reasonable competition. 
Finally, Iowa’s redistricting commission employs a unique 
structure, in that a semi-independent state agency, the Legislative 
Services Agency (LSA), performs the redistricting, subject to 
legislative approval. The LSA is purportedly nonpartisan,104 but as 
critics of the system have noted, LSA employees serve at the pleasure 
of a body controlled by the legislative majority.105 On the other hand, 
supporters note that plans produced by the LSA have nonetheless 
kept congressional districts competitive, even as competition in 
districts nationwide has been anemic at best.106 
 
select two members, and that the eight so selected shall select a ninth as chairperson by a six-
vote majority). 
 102. The major unspoken premise here, of course, is that the marginal benefits of the 
bipartisan gerrymander are outweighed by the marginal costs of producing a plan that attracts 
an opponent’s vote, rather than that of the neutral chair. 
 103. See Persily, supra note 95, at 678 (arguing that, even if a philosopher-king could be 
found to develop and apply neutral redistricting principles, redistricting by self-interested 
representatives yields philosophically preferable results); Kubin, supra note 82, at 848–49, 849 
n.67 (arguing that politically neutral districting is preferable despite the inability to ensure 
perfect neutrality). 
 104. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 2A.1 (West 1999) (“A legislative services agency is created as a 
nonpartisan, central legislative staff agency under the direction and control of the legislative 
council. The agency shall cooperate with and serve all members of the general assembly, the 
legislative council, and committees of the general assembly.”). 
 105. Persily, supra note 95, at 675. 
 106. See Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 624–26 (contrasting the vitality of competition in Iowa 
House races with what were anticipated to be uncompetitive races in Massachusetts, California, 
Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Texas, New Jersey, and New York). But see Persily, supra note 95, at 
675 (attributing district competitiveness to Iowa’s political culture rather than to features of the 
institutional form of its redistricting process). 
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B. The Perceived Benefits of Independent Redistricting Commissions 
Selection of the institutional form for a redistricting commission 
has concrete consequences for both the process and outcome of 
redistricting. When properly designed, such commissions can 
moderate excessive partisanship without completely excising the 
political character of the process. Tie-breaker commissions 
accomplish this by including equal numbers of political members but 
placing the deciding vote in the hands of a nonaligned tie-breaking 
member. They thus provide an antimajoritarian brake on partisan 
gerrymandering,107 while equally discouraging minority 
obstructionism, by threatening each side with the loss of the tie-
breaking vote. 
Moreover, a holdout dynamic is unlikely to emerge in tie-breaker 
commissions. Because losing the tie-breaking vote means that the 
opponent’s proposal succeeds, the cost of holding out is very high. 
Both parties are thus discouraged from refusing to compromise in the 
hopes of moving the redistricting fight to a judicial forum—a practice 
that is common in legislatures and in purely bipartisan commissions. 
Instead, the institutional promotion of moderation and compromise 
effected by the tie-breaker form, along with the reduced self-dealing 
produced by removing legislators from the process, allows other 
important values to come to the fore.108 
It is worth reiterating that elimination of all political 
considerations from the redistricting process is neither an expected 
nor desired result of the adoption of a commission model, despite 
critics’ suggestions to the contrary.109 The common description of such 
commissions as “nonpartisan” is admittedly incorrect; it is merely a 
useful linguistic handle to distinguish them from purely “bipartisan” 
commissions that tend to result in “bipartisan” cooperative 
 
 107. Note that, because the relevant majority here is legislative, rather than popular, 
“antimajoritarian” is not necessarily equivalent to “antidemocratic.” Because of the “winner’s 
bonus” allocated by the first-past-the-post, districted election system prevalent in our country, it 
is likely that the majority party is legislatively overrepresented relative to the general 
population. See Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 
765–67 (2004) (defining partisan fairness in redistricting in terms of the symmetry of the 
winner’s bonus). 
 108. In many instances, these are constitutionally or statutorily mandated redistricting 
criteria that might otherwise be slighted by partisan or self-serving ardor. See, e.g., ARIZ. 
CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14) (setting out a hierarchy of redistricting goals). 
 109. See Persily, supra note 95, at 673–79 (suggesting that such commissions are merely self-
defeating attempts to “get[] the politics out of politics”). 
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gerrymandering or “bipartisan” deadlock. However, the search for 
institutional controls that further the public interest in representative 
governance by inducing partisan actors to compromise and moderate 
their political aims should not be dismissed out of hand because of 
nomenclature. The ideal, and a more accurate though less euphonic 
label, is simply “less-partisan.” A truly nonpartisan system, perhaps 
following Professor John Hart Ely’s pungent suggestion to merely 
“[g]rid the [d]amn [t]hing,”110 might well result in startling 
inequities.111 Many of our governmental institutions instead rely on 
the adversarial process, tempered by institutional checks and 
balances, to work in the public interest; removing redistricting from 
the hands of self-interested legislators would more accurately align 
the process with this tradition. 
In addition to reducing political bias in redistricting outcomes, 
independent redistricting commissions may have significant corollary 
benefits. For instance, redistricting plans drawn by nonpartisan 
commissions may increase the competitiveness of individual districts, 
as in Iowa.112 Theoretically, increased district competitiveness brings a 
corresponding increase in the responsiveness of district 
representation113 and may also marginally reduce voter apathy by 
removing one basis for the perception that individual electoral 
participation is irrelevant because electoral outcomes are a foregone 
conclusion.114 Further, removing redistricting from the already-full 
plates of state legislatures will increase the amount of legislative time 
available to devote to other important issues. Finally, redistricting 
 
 110. John Hart Ely, Gerrymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L. REV. 607, 
635 & n.124 (1998). 
 111. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (decrying “politically mindless 
approach[es]” as likely to produce “the most grossly gerrymandered results”). 
 112. See Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 623–26 (contrasting the general state of incumbent 
entrenchment, with 98.5% incumbency retention in the 2000 congressional elections, with 
Iowa’s four “highly competitive” House races in 2002). 
 113. See id. at 627–28 (explaining that noncompetitiveness prevents electoral outcomes from 
reflecting actual voter preferences). 
 114. It was argued in 1997, even before the Clinton impeachment, Bush v. Gore, and other 
depressing notables of recent political history, that independent redistricting commissions were 
justifiable because representative government has so little public confidence that virtually any 
reform offering the hope of improved public perceptions would be a welcome change. See 
Kubin, supra note 82, at 859–60, 860 n.120. 
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commissions may even realize tangible monetary savings by reducing 
administrative overhead relative to full legislative consideration.115 
C. “Success” among Independent Redistricting Commissions 
The debate over whether existing independent redistricting 
commissions represent an improvement over redistricting by state 
legislatures continues unabated, but it is largely theoretical because of 
the difficulty of defining standards and metrics that allow useful 
comparisons.116 Anecdotal evidence does suggest that the tie-breaker 
model can effect at least a marginal reduction in partisanship in the 
redistricting process.117 Given the continued litigation of plans in 
states with such commissions, however, they are clearly not a 
panacea.118 In the redistricting cycle following the 2000 census, 51 
percent of legislature-drawn plans and 50 percent of commission-
drawn plans were litigated.119 Although a single redistricting cycle is 
insufficient to draw statistically valid conclusions about the rate of 
challenges, it is unlikely that adoption of the independent redistricting 
commission model significantly reduces litigation of redistricting 
plans. This is hardly surprising, though; given the stakes of 
redistricting fights, the inability to generate an objectively fair 
 
 115. Texas, for instance, spent more than five million dollars funding its three special 
legislative sessions during the 2003 re-redistricting process. John Ratliff, Texas Republicans 
Crossed the Line This Time, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at B1. 
 116. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 29 (arguing that indicia of district competitiveness 
such as reelection rates and margins of victory could serve as metrics for measuring the success 
of politically insulated commissions); Persily, supra note 95 (criticizing Professor Issacharoff’s 
argument in favor of independent commissions in part by questioning the usefulness of the 
suggested metrics). 
 117. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., The Practice of Redistricting, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1030–
31 (2001) (reflecting on personal experiences in Colorado’s redistricting processes and offering 
suggestions to further reduce partisan effects on the independent commission). 
 118. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Redistricting Cases: The 2000s, 
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/redsum2000.htm (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2005) [hereinafter NCSL, 2000s Redistricting Litigation] (summarizing litigation 
challenging redistricting plans in each of the states during the 2000 cycle); NCSL, 1990s 
Redistricting Litigation, supra note 2 (same for the 1990 cycle). 
 119. Eleven of eighteen state legislative redistricting plans and two of eight congressional 
redistricting plans drawn by commissions were challenged in court; in comparison, eighteen of 
thirty-two state legislative redistricting plans and twenty of forty-two congressional redistricting 
plans drawn by state legislatures were challenged. NCSL, 2000s Redistricting Litigation, supra 
note 118. These summaries represent only cases self-reported to NCSL, which may affect the 
data significantly. In addition, the data reported here presume that when redistricting plans 
went unchallenged in states with backup commissions the legislatures had drawn the plans; if 
incorrect, this assumption would overstate the rate at which commission plans were litigated. 
032006 03_BATES.DOC 4/24/2006  12:28 PM 
2005] STATE REDISTRICTING 355 
districting map, and the ready availability of partisan litigants, it is 
unlikely that anything other than a restriction on courts’ subject 
matter jurisdiction will successfully reduce the caseload generated by 
redistricting. 
As continued litigation is likely regardless of the adoption of 
redistricting commissions, perhaps a better metric for measuring their 
success would be the rate at which their redistricting plans are upheld. 
As several commentators have noted, the pattern of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence suggests that plans drawn by a disinterested party, 
whether a commission or a judge, may be an informal safe harbor 
against claims of racial gerrymandering.120 Moreover, during the 1980 
and 1990 redistricting cycles, plans adopted by commissions fared 
remarkably well compared with legislature-drawn plans.121 Thus, 
although litigation following redistricting may be unavoidable, it 
might be possible to avoid the costs of court-ordered re-redistricting 
(and, likely, litigating the second plan) by adopting the commission 
model. 
D. Obstacles to Adoption of Independent Redistricting Commissions 
However normatively desirable independent redistricting 
commissions may be, there remain significant institutional pressures 
against their adoption in states that still delegate redistricting to their 
legislatures. To move from redistricting-by-legislature to redistricting-
by-commission, power must be wrested from the grasp of legislators 
who are loath to relinquish it. Despite relatively frequent calls for 
such commissions, actual conversions are rare: in the last seven years, 
only two states have switched to the commission model, and both 
successful conversions required a popular referendum to approve a 
state constitutional amendment.122 By contrast, numerous legislative 
 
 120. Ely, supra note 110, at 634–35; Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 646–47; Kubin, supra note 
82, at 868–72. 
 121. See Kubin, supra note 82, at 862–68 (surveying “the litigation win-loss record of 
commissions in . . . state supreme court and federal district court opinions” adjudicating 
challenges to commission-drawn redistricting plans). 
 122. In 1998, Alaska voters approved a ballot measure that amended the constitutional 
provisions implementing an advisory commission model to require a commission with primary 
responsibility for drawing state legislative districts. ALASKA DIV. OF ELECTIONS, ALASKA 1998 
OFFICIAL ELECTION PAMPHLET, BALLOT MEASURE 3 (1998), available at 
http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/1998oep/98bal3.htm. In 2000, Arizona voters 
approved Proposition 106, which set up an independent commission with responsibility for 
redrawing both legislative and congressional districts. ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2000 BALLOT 
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efforts have failed. For instance, both the Kansas and North Carolina 
legislatures considered bills in 2003 that would have delegated their 
redistricting processes to independent commissions,123 but both 
measures failed. As the dean of the University of North Carolina Law 
School commented during a prior North Carolina dalliance with 
conversion to a commission system, “I feel more secure about my civil 
liberties in a state without initiative powers. I am also, however, far 
less optimistic about the possibilities for political reform.”124 
Recent efforts at such political reforms have moved forward only 
haltingly in referendum states: Common Cause, a nonpartisan public-
interest advocacy group, placed an amendment to the Ohio state 
constitution on the November 2005 ballot that would have created a 
bipartisan redistricting commission,125 and Governor Schwarzenegger 
of California supported a ballot proposition that would have 
appointed a panel of retired judges to redraw congressional and 
legislative districts in an attempt to improve electoral 
competitiveness.126 Although neither of these measures was 
successful,127 the reform movement may not yet be exhausted. The 
Committee for Fair Elections is collecting signatures in Florida in 
support of a 2006 ballot initiative to create a nonpartisan redistricting 
body,128 a Republican state senator in Nevada has proposed adopting 
 
PROPOSITIONS, PROPOSITION 106 (2000), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2000/Info/ 
pubpamphlet/english/prop106.pdf. 
 123. S. Con. Res. 1607, 80th Leg., 2003 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2003); H.B. 1060, 2003 Gen. Assem., 
Sess. 2003 (N.C. 2003). 
 124. Nichol, supra note 117, at 1030 n.6. 
 125. Common Cause, Reform Ohio Now, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkL 
NK1MQIwG&b=880499 (last visited Dec. 29, 2005); see also Initiative Petition, http://www. 
commoncause.org/atf/cf/{FB3C17E2-CDD1-4DF6-92BEBD4429893665}/ron_amendments.pdf, 
at 1–3 (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) (providing the text of the proposed amendment). 
 126. John M. Broder, Schwarzenegger Proposes Overhaul of Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
6, 2005, at A16. 
 127. See Brookings Institution, Redistricting Reform after the Failed Ohio and California 
Initiatives 3 (Nov. 15, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/ 
20051115.pdf) (comments of Thomas Mann) (noting the failure of reform proposals in both 
states); id. at 12 (comments of Bruce Cain) (attributing the defeat of the California proposal in 
part to its perceived lack of bipartisanship); id. at 19 (comments of Michael McDonald) 
(attributing the defeat of the Ohio proposal in part to its requirement of mid-decade 
redistricting and concomitant fears of partisan motivation in light of Texas’s experience). 
 128. Florida’s Committee for Fair Elections, http://www.committeeforfairelections.com (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2005); see also FairVote. Florida Redistricting Watch, 
http://www.fairvote.org/?page=1390 (last visited Dec. 29, 2005) (detailing the effect of the 
proposed state constitutional amendments). 
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an independent commission model there,129 and efforts at reform 
remain ongoing in Massachusetts and other states.130 
As the experiences of Kansas and North Carolina show, pressure 
external to the normal tensions of state governance may be necessary 
for change to occur. But, as the cases of Ohio and California 
demonstrate, such external pressure may not be sufficient to achieve 
significant reform. Although a national consensus on whether 
redistricting should be removed from the purview of state legislatures 
has not yet been achieved,131 the numerous reform efforts now 
underway suggest that an ever-larger segment of the population is 
becoming engaged by the issue. Moreover, if the failures of single-
state reform initiatives can be attributed in part to fears of partisan 
motivation, as in Ohio and California,132 a nationwide federal solution 
may garner greater popular support because the perception of 
partisan motivation would be diminished when the beneficiaries of 
such a move were obscured, at least relative to a single-state reform 
effort. These conditions, combined with the persuasive normative 
case for independent redistricting commissions as a buffer against 
partisan gerrymandering, compel the investigation of what Congress’s 
power may be when such a consensus emerges. Indeed, such an 
investigation is particularly timely, given that efforts to impose a 
federal solution are already afoot, as evidenced by the introduction in 
Congress of the Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act 
(FIRA) of 2005.133 The next Part initiates this investigation. 
 
 129. Elizabeth White, Nevada Redistricting Proposal Stems from 2001 Fight, LAS VEGAS 
SUN, May 9, 2005, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/nevada/ 
2005/may/09/050910899.html. 
 130. FairVote, Massachusetts Redistricting Watch, http://www.fairvote.org/?page=1395 (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2005). 
 131. Cf. Hasen, supra note 62, at 641 (“The adoption of redistricting by commission in 
initiative states would be the best indication of an emerging social consensus against partisan 
redistricting.”). 
 132. See Brookings Institution, supra note 127, at 12, 19 (suggesting the role played by fear 
of underlying partisanship in the defeat of both proposals). 
 133. H.R. 2642, 109th Cong. (2005). The FIRA would require states to adopt an 
independent commission on the tie-breaker model, which would be tasked with producing a 
congressional districting map submitted to an up-or-down vote of the legislature, with 
responsibility devolving onto state and federal courts in the event of legislative inability to 
secure its passage. Substantive criteria such as compactness and contiguity would be imposed on 
the districting process, and commission members would be disqualified from running for 
congressional office during the ten years following implementation of the map. See Press 
Release, Rep. John Tanner, Tanner Redistricting Bill Similar to 1989 Sensenbrenner Proposal 
(Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/tanner/press109-049.htm (comparing 
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III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR CONGRESSIONAL 
ACTION 
From the earliest cases challenging how states have drawn 
district lines through the Supreme Court’s October 2003 Term, 
federal courts have consistently reiterated that Congress retains 
constitutional authority to take positive action to address violations of 
representational rights. Justice Frankfurter, cautioning against 
judicial entry into the “political thicket” of redistricting,134 argued that 
the Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to 
secure fair representation by the States in the popular House and 
left to that House determination whether States have fulfilled their 
responsibility. . . . Whether Congress faithfully discharges its duty or 
not, the subject has been committed to the exclusive control of 
Congress.135 
This claim was an important contention in Justice Scalia’s argument 
for the Vieth plurality that the precedent recognizing the justiciability 
of partisan gerrymanders should be overruled: “[T]he Framers 
provided a remedy for such practices in the Constitution. Article I,  
§ 4, while leaving in state legislatures the initial power to draw 
districts for federal elections, permitted Congress to ‘make or alter’ 
those districts if it wished.”136 If Congress, as the Vieth plurality 
suggests, has sufficient constitutional authority to impose its own 
redistricting map on the states, then surely a procedural requirement, 
such as the use of an independent redistricting commission to control 
partisan gerrymandering, is not an ultra vires intrusion into states’ 
prerogatives over redistricting. 
The argument for constitutional justification proceeds first by 
sketching a proposition for congressional action to provide a standard 
against which the constitutional sufficiency of Congress’s legislative 
authority may be measured. For purposes of historical comparison, 
prior instances of federal legislation regulating congressional 
redistricting are then briefly considered; these instances of 
congressional control over state redistricting processes suggest a 
 
provisions of the FIRA with the Congressional Districting Reform Act of 1989). In virtually all 
respects except its failure to address state legislative redistricting, the FIRA accords with the 
proposal for action put forward by this Note. See infra Part III.A. 
 134. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
 135. Id. at 554. 
 136. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
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number of constitutional bases for further federal action of the type 
suggested here. In particular, congressional action may be justified 
under the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4, and under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, this Note briefly considers the 
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4, as a potential basis for 
positive congressional action. 
A. A Straw-Man Proposal for Action 
The basic requirement of the proposed legislation would be that 
no state could adopt a redistricting plan, either for congressional or 
state legislative districts, unless it were drawn by an independent 
commission meeting specified structural criteria and operating 
pursuant to certain procedural criteria. 
The “best practices” of states using redistricting commissions, 
discussed in Part II.A, suggest such structural criteria. Based upon the 
states’ experiences with redistricting-by-commission, Congress could 
reasonably require that membership of the commission conform to 
one or another of the variants on the tie-breaker model, perhaps 
allowing some latitude for state-by-state variations so long as the 
basic structure were observed. Further restrictions on membership, 
such as a prohibition on current or recent members of the state 
legislature and a civil disability requirement preventing commission 
members from running for legislative or statewide executive offices, 
would provide additional assurances that political self-interest is not a 
prominent feature of commission decisionmaking. Requiring that the 
commission staff be similarly independent also seems sensible.137 This 
list of structural criteria is by no means exhaustive. 
The set of procedural criteria to be used by the commissions 
could also be specified at the federal level, although it might be 
appropriate to preserve some degree of state flexibility to recognize 
the importance of continued experimentation by states in their 
approaches to representative democracy. Moreover, retaining such 
flexibility would preserve the character of the suggested reform as a 
purely institution-selecting one, rather than making it an outcome-
 
 137. Cf. Persily, supra note 95, at 675 (noting, as part of a broader criticism of the project to 
insulate redistricting from partisanship, that the staff of Iowa’s Legislative Services Agency “is 
appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Legislative Council, which the majority party in 
the legislature controls”). 
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oriented restriction on the states’ prerogatives.138 But if procedural 
criteria were required of state redistricting commissions, those 
imposed by Arizona on its redistricting commission—such as 
contiguity and compactness, respect for the integrity of “communities 
of interest,” and competitiveness139—might serve as an intelligent 
starting point for a set of guiding principles. Additional criteria worth 
considering might include a restriction on the information upon which 
redistricting commissions may base their decisions, such as political 
affiliations of registered voters, previous election results, addresses of 
incumbent legislators,140 or a formalization of the decennial 
redistricting cycle, as other scholars have already proposed.141 
Congress could choose from a wide range of implementation 
mechanisms, some more intrusive upon states’ traditional 
prerogatives than others, some more likely constitutional than others. 
For instance, rather than directly requiring states to adopt 
independent redistricting commissions, Congress could make 
disbursal of federal funds in key policy areas contingent on states’ 
adoption of such commissions. This tried-and-true approach would 
almost certainly not violate constitutional norms.142 On the other 
hand, Congress could undertake to remove redistricting from the 
states’ purview entirely, perhaps by requiring that all redistricting be 
done by a federal redistricting commission; whether the courts would 
 
 138. Note, however, that this would be a fundamentally political, rather than constitutional, 
choice—the validity of congressional requirements of contiguity, compactness and other 
common redistricting criteria is well established. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 275–76 (discussing 
approvingly prior congressional regulation of such criteria in state redistricting processes). 
 139. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(14) (listing redistricting goals which the state 
redistricting commission is required to accommodate). 
 140. Restrictions on the use of these data, among others, are imposed by statute on the Iowa 
Legislative Services Agency. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 42.4(5) (West 1999) (prohibiting 
consideration of certain data during the redistricting process). 
 141. See Cox, supra note 107, at 782 (proposing a decennial floor on redistricting). 
 142. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987) (requiring that the object 
of the funding conditions advance the general welfare, that the conditions be unambiguous and 
not unrelated to the purpose of the federal spending program, and that the conditions not 
themselves be subject to an independent constitutional bar). Given the reach of the Spending 
Clause precedents, it seems difficult to argue that requiring the use of independent redistricting 
commissions as a condition for disbursal of federal funds would be unconstitutional, so long as 
the requirement were rationally related to the purpose of the funds, as would clearly be the case 
with federal election funding. Simply because such a method would be constitutional, however, 
does not guarantee that it would be effective; the federal leverage on state legislatures in this 
instance might simply be too small to overcome legislators’ inertia and self-interest. Thus, this 
Note looks to the more radical proposition of Congress directly requiring state action and 
attempts to justify its authority to do so. See infra Part III.B–D. 
032006 03_BATES.DOC 4/24/2006  12:28 PM 
2005] STATE REDISTRICTING 361 
invalidate such a move is a much closer question.143 The middle path 
proposed here, however—an institution-selecting requirement that 
nonetheless leaves the task of redistricting in state hands—is intended 
to approximate the proper outer bound of constitutional authority for 
direct action and to illustrate certain constitutional problems that 
such action might engender.144 
B. The Elections Clause as a Basis of Authority 
The first plausible basis of constitutional authority is the 
Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4.145 Considering the prior 
history of congressional regulation of redistricting, this clause could 
reasonably support further congressional action regulating the 
decennial revision of congressional districts. The scope of the 
Elections Clause, however, is limited to federal elections. Moreover, 
reliance upon it to justify the proposed legislation could raise 
significant Tenth Amendment concerns. 
Reliance on the Elections Clause provides clear precedent for 
congressional control over redistricting. The Apportionment Act of 
1842,146 enacted pursuant to this clause, instituted the first federal 
restrictions on the boundaries of congressional districts, providing a 
clear demonstration that the Elections Clause can be a source of 
congressional authority in this area. Subsequent acts, enacted under 
the same authority, enlarged the set of federal requirements imposed 
on state redistricting practices.147 Congressional authority under the 
 
 143. The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that redistricting is primarily a responsibility 
and prerogative of the states. E.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 33–35 (1993); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964); see also Cox, supra note 107, at 780–81, 780 n.114. 
 144. In many respects, this proposal is quite similar to the Fairness and Independence in 
Redistricting Act (FIRA) of 2005, H.R. 2642, 109th Cong. (2005). The primary difference is that 
the proposal advanced here would extend to state legislative redistricting, while the FIRA is 
limited to congressional redistricting. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 145. Article I, Section 4 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations.” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 146. Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (requiring single-member districts and 
district contiguity). 
 147. See, e.g., Apportionment Act of 1901, ch. 93, 31 Stat. 733 (imposing a district 
compactness requirement); Apportionment Act of 1872, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28 (imposing an 
equipopulation requirement). 
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Elections Clause to enact such redistricting rules for congressional 
districts has been essentially unquestioned in modern times.148 
However, the action suggested in this Note would extend ideally 
to state legislative redistricting. But, the Elections Clause is limited to 
elections of members of the federal legislature; justifying interference 
with election procedures for state legislative officials seems well 
beyond its scope. 
Other potential problems with relying on congressional authority 
derived from the Elections Clause could arise with respect to the 
balance of federal-state power and the underlying principle of 
federalism. Unlike previously enacted outcome-based restrictions, 
such as contiguity or compactness of districts,149 or even proposed 
process-based restrictions, such as a lower bound on the frequency of 
redistricting,150 a requirement that state legislatures delegate their 
authority over redistricting to independent commissions is an 
institution-selecting regulation.151 As a general matter, institution-
selecting devices such as that proposed here seem least compatible 
with the Elections Clause’s initial textual commitment of 
responsibility for redistricting to state legislatures, although this 
commitment may be more elastic than an initial reading would 
indicate.152 
A more pressing federalism concern is that the proposed action, 
if justified under the Elections Clause, could run afoul of the Tenth 
Amendment and the Supreme Court’s admonishment in New York v. 
United States that “[t]he Federal Government may not compel the 
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”153 If, as 
New York suggests, Congress is limited to noncoercive methods of 
“urg[ing] a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with 
 
 148. Cox, supra note 107, at 794 & n.164. Earlier views of congressional authority under the 
Elections Clause were more circumscribed. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 555 (1946) 
(collecting nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century commentary questioning the extent of 
congressional powers under the clause). 
 149. See Apportionment Act of 1901, ch. 93, 31 Stat. 733 (compactness); Apportionment Act 
of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (contiguity). 
 150. See Cox, supra note 107, at 782 (proposing a lower bound on redistricting frequency). 
 151. See id. at 756 (categorizing redistricting regulations as outcome-based, process-based, 
and institution-selecting). 
 152. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 266–72 (2003) (reaffirming the propriety of judicially 
drawn district boundaries in the absence of legislative action). 
 153. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
032006 03_BATES.DOC 4/24/2006  12:28 PM 
2005] STATE REDISTRICTING 363 
federal interests,”154 then regulation under the Elections Clause that 
required state implementing legislation would risk being considered 
legislative commandeering. A requirement that states set up and fund 
independent redistricting commissions may well violate the Supreme 
Court’s injunction that “state legislatures are not subject to federal 
direction.”155 
This question, “[w]hether the anticommandeering principle of 
New York and Printz is as robust in the Article I, § 4, context . . . as it 
is in the Article I, § 8, context,”156 is addressed squarely in Branch v. 
Smith. In that case, which briefly considered the constitutionality of 
coercing states into performing their constitutionally mandated task 
of redistricting under 2 U.S.C. § 2c, the Court held that such federal 
prescriptions are permissible regulations under the Elections Clause: 
To be sure, § 2c “envisions legislative action,” but in the context of 
Article I, § 4, cl. 1, such “Regulations” are expressly allowed. . . . 
Congress was not placing a statutory obligation on the state 
legislatures as it was in New York v. United States; rather it was 
regulating . . . the manner in which a State is to fulfill its pre-existing 
constitutional obligations . . . .157 
The congressional action proposed here would require many, if not 
most, states to pass legislation delegating authority and appropriating 
funds to redistricting commissions, potentially distinguishing the 
proposed action from the regulation in Branch in that the state 
legislation envisioned by 2 U.S.C. § 2c involves only the adoption of 
redistricting plans. Although it seems unlikely that the proposed 
legislation (at least as to congressional redistricting) would be struck 
down on anticommandeering grounds, the action suggested here 
could certainly be seen as violating the values of federalism and 
comity that underlie recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. Thus, 
the initial assumption of essentially unlimited congressional authority 
to regulate congressional redistricting procedures under the Elections 
Clause may not be wholly warranted. At the same time, Branch 
provides some support for the idea that federal legislation of the type 
 
 154. Id. at 166; see id. at 168 (“By either of these methods, as by any other permissible 
method of encouraging a State to conform to federal policy choices, the residents of the State 
retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will comply.” (emphasis added)). 
 155. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997). 
 156. Branch, 538 U.S. at 302 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 157. Id. at 280 (citations omitted). 
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this Note advocates would be a permissible regulation under the 
Elections Clause, at least as to congressional districts. 
C. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a Basis of Authority 
The second plausible constitutional basis for the proposed 
congressional action is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which enforces the guarantee of equal protection.158 As the Voting 
Rights Act159 demonstrates, legislation protecting the elective 
franchise against violations of equal protection can reach both 
congressional and state legislative redistricting practices.160 Moreover, 
the Supreme Court’s recognition in Bandemer and Vieth of the equal 
protection violation implied by partisan gerrymanders provides a 
constitutional basis for using Congress’s Section 5 powers to enact 
legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, even if no 
judicially manageable standards are discernible to adjudicate the 
claims of individual plaintiffs. 
But although such recognition should give wide latitude to 
remedial legislation to correct existing gerrymanders, the suggested 
reforms are effectively a prophylactic rule not unlike the statutory 
requirement of preclearance of redistricting plans under Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act.161 Congressional authority to enact such 
prophylactic legislation has been severely limited by the line of 
decisions stemming from City of Boerne v. Flores,162 under which 
congressional action must be congruent and proportional to the 
constitutional harm in order to prevent Congress from legislatively 
expanding the substantive meaning of the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses.163 The degree of judicial deference accorded to 
congressional judgment about the constitutional violation at issue 
depends upon the level of scrutiny applied to alleged violations of the 
right asserted; when the right being protected is one viewed as 
 
 158. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power “to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation,” the substantive guarantees of equal protection and due process of law 
found in Section 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 159. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973–1973p (2000)). 
 160. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966) (upholding Section 4(e) of the 
Voting Rights Act as a proper exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
 162. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 163. Id. at 519–20. 
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“fundamental,” Congress need not build a record of pervasive 
unconstitutional state government action violating the right 
asserted.164 
Although the racial classifications targeted by the Voting Rights 
Act served to justify its prophylactic rules,165 the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the “constitutional ‘right’ to vote”166 has varied 
significantly over time.167 This raises the important question whether 
infringement of the right is sufficient to justify prophylactic legislation 
under Section 5 in the absence of considerable documentation of 
pervasive unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering. Such a 
requirement might place a Congress that attempted to legislate 
against partisan gerrymandering into an even more difficult position 
than a private plaintiff challenging a gerrymander who sought to 
satisfy the Davis v. Bandemer standard by documenting the consistent 
degradation of voters’ influence over the political process as a 
whole.168 This would be an odd result, given Bandemer’s prior 
 
 164. Compare Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 645 (1999) (“The legislative record . . . suggests that the Patent Remedy Act [abrogating 
state sovereign immunity against patent infringement claims] does not respond to a history of 
‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the sort Congress has faced in 
enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation.” (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
526 (1997))), with Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003) (“Because the 
standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult 
to meet than our rational-basis test . . . it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state 
constitutional violations.”). 
 165. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (“Congress was similarly successful in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, where we upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Because racial classifications are 
presumptively invalid, most of the States’ acts of race discrimination violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
 166. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993). 
 167. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (“It has been repeatedly recognized that 
all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to vote . . . .”). According to the 
recent interpretation of one noted constitutional scholar, “[a]s the Constitution is now 
understood, states are not required to provide elections for state offices. But when elections are 
held, the right to vote qualifies as fundamental . . . .” Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2096 (2005) (footnote omitted); cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 
(2000) (noting that although there is no constitutional right to vote for electors in a presidential 
election, once states hold such elections the right to vote is fundamental). 
 168. See 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (noting that the Court cannot presume degradation of 
political influence from election results without additional proofs presented by the plaintiff); cf. 
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 377, 389–90 & app. A (2001) 
(determining that “[t]he legislative record of the [Americans with Disabilities Act] . . . simply 
fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in 
employment against the disabled,” despite the dissent’s thirty-nine page appendix documenting 
the “vast legislative record [of] ‘massive, society-wide discrimination’ against persons with 
disabilities”); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 640, 645 (finding that, 
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recognition of the constitutional nature of gerrymandering violations 
and the strident calls for the whole matter to be declared a 
nonjusticiable political question, but it certainly is not out of the 
question. 
However, if future partisan gerrymandering cases are to be 
nonjusticiable,169 it seems that such a judicial commitment of the issue 
to the political branches implies an expectation of deference to action 
by the political branches to correct the problems the judiciary was 
unable or unwilling to solve. Thus, prophylactic legislation to correct 
the equal protection violation recognized in Bandemer should be 
evaluated under the deferential standard of Hibbs, given that the 
courts have already identified the targeted wrong, so long as the 
congressional action is rationally related to the problem of partisan 
gerrymandering. 
D. The Guarantee Clause as a Basis of Authority 
The final potential constitutional basis for congressional action is 
the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4,170 though it has long 
been dismissed for not being “a repository of judicially manageable 
standards” to evaluate claimed violations of representational rights.171 
The inability of judges to discern manageable standards from a 
constitutional provision cannot imply that the legislative and 
executive branches are similarly powerless with respect to it. To hold 
that the Guarantee Clause has no potential for positive congressional 
action simply because cases arising under it have been deemed 
nonjusticiable would effectively read the clause out of the 
Constitution entirely. To return to a prior theme, the commitment of 
a question to the political branches is an invitation to action by the 
political branches and necessarily carries an implication of the power 
 
because “Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern 
of constitutional violations,” “[t]he legislative record thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act 
does not respond to a history of ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’ 
of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5 legislation” (quoting City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)). 
 169. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305 (2004) (plurality opinion) (inviting lower 
courts to interpret Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as a “reluctant fifth vote against 
justiciability”); see also supra notes 63–72 and accompanying text. 
 170. Article IV, Section 4 provides, in relevant part, that the “United States shall guarantee 
to every state . . . a Republican Form of Government.” U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4. 
 171. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962); see id. at 224 (holding that challenges to state 
or federal action based on the Guarantee Clause do not present a justiciable question). 
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to undertake such action. Any other result changes the political 
question doctrine from a prudential rule of judicial administration 
into a unilaterally exercised tool to render disfavored portions of the 
Constitution nugatory. 
Intriguing revisionist scholarship by Professor (now Judge) 
Michael McConnell172 suggests that the reliance of Baker v. Carr and 
Reynolds v. Sims on the Equal Protection Clause, rather than on the 
Guarantee Clause, for judicially manageable standards to address 
malapportionment has led ineluctably to the racial and partisan 
gerrymandering problems common in redistricting maps and legal 
battles of the present day.173 If the question is whether a state system 
of government prevents effective majority rule, rather than whether 
an individual is unable to exercise equally the right to vote, then 
partisan gerrymandering “designed to entrench a particular political 
faction against effective political challenge” violates easily derivable 
constitutional norms.174 Although such a doctrinal shift may not 
immediately yield standards for judicial restraint of partisan 
gerrymanders,175 the republicanism norm embodied in the Guarantee 
Clause provides a strong argument for Congress’s retention of 
authority to undertake legislative action against partisan 
gerrymanders. 
IV.  POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO CONGRESSIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
OF INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS 
Even if the action proposed here is constitutionally permissible, 
there remain significant obstacles to effective implementation. 
Foremost among these is the political difficulty in assembling a 
congressional majority and a presidential signature to actually enact 
the legislation. A less obvious, though no less destructive, issue is the 
potential for partisan capture of the implementation process. 
 
 172. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current 
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2000). 
 173. Id. at 106–07. 
 174. Id. at 116. 
 175. As Professor Issacharoff notes, Judge McConnell’s interpretation of the Guarantee 
Clause “may better capture the constitutional interest in the context of the extreme 
malapportionment evident in Baker or Reynolds,” but “[a]t some level, the same problems that 
challenge the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence will reassert themselves in trying to give 
content to the equally open-textured [Guarantee] Clause.” Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 614. 
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The largest hurdle to implementation of the proposed action is 
political—the unlikelihood of its adoption by Congress. So far as 
congressional redistricting goes, such a measure would require 
incumbent members of Congress to vote against their own interests. 
As discussed in Part II.D, there is a reason that effective, independent 
commissions are generally adopted through popular referenda. 
Moreover, given partisan actors’ belief that gerrymandering delivers 
favorable electoral results, as evidenced by their continued 
willingness to carve states into bizarre districts, the political calculus 
suggests that party as well as individual interests would strongly 
oppose a proposal uniformly requiring independent redistricting 
commissions. As one scholar argues, a social consensus or near-
consensus in favor of such commissions may be a necessary 
precondition to either legislative or judicial willingness to force 
reluctant states into adopting the redistricting-by-commission 
model.176 In the congressional context, such consensus may be even 
more necessary, in that representatives unresponsive to voter 
preferences are insulated from electoral reproach by the lack of 
competition for their seats—the very state of affairs that a 
congressional requirement of independent redistricting commissions 
seeks to overturn. 
Moreover, if the insights of social choice theory hold true as 
applied to politics,177 then congressional power to force the states to 
adopt redistricting commissions may simply lead to even greater 
partisanship under the banner of independence. The doctrinal 
underpinnings of equal protection and the historical experience of 
remedying race-based voter discrimination provide a roadmap for 
one possible avenue for such capture: partisan-motivated selective 
application of independent commissions. 
Imagine that the House Republican leadership, seeking to 
further increase the Republican margin in the 2012 elections and 
intrigued by the failed 2005 ballot measure proposed by Governor 
 
 176. See Hasen, supra note 62, at 641–42 (suggesting that judicial intervention in partisan 
gerrymandering cases, such as prophylactically requiring employment of an independent 
commission model, must await a more defined social consensus). 
 177. In essence, social choice theory holds that whoever controls the means controls the 
ends. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 75–80 (2d ed. 1963). In 
the political context, one scholar notes that “all election mechanisms are vulnerable to 
manipulation . . . by those who structure the rules concerning the presentation of questions to 
voters to create pathways that favor one or another outcome.” Issacharoff, supra note 29, at 595. 
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Schwarzenegger,178 introduces legislation requiring California, and 
only California, to implement an independent redistricting 
commission.179 The idea would be that by breaking Democratic 
congressional incumbents’ hold on their seats, Republicans would 
stand greatly improved chances of picking up seats within the 
remarkably static California delegation.180 Both doctrine and 
precedent under the Equal Protection Clause would support such a 
move. In fact, precisely this kind of targeting by the Voting Rights 
Act was upheld in South Carolina v. Katzenbach:181 “The Act 
intentionally confines these remedies to a small number of States and 
political subdivisions which in most instances were familiar to 
Congress by name. . . . In acceptable legislative fashion, Congress 
chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate 
action seemed necessary.”182 If the coverage criteria are rationally 
related to the evil that Congress seeks to remedy, they are 
permissible;183 it does not matter that similarly situated states might be 
excluded.184 
The primary limitation on this model of partisan-motivated 
selective application is the overall limitation on congressional power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed by City of 
Boerne v. Flores. If Boerne were read to require state-specific findings 
and documentation of pervasive unconstitutional action by each state 
 
 178. See Broder, supra note 126, at A16. 
 179. Plainly, if the electoral positions were reversed, the political incentives would be the 
same, or even stronger, for Democrats to behave in an identical manner toward a 
gerrymandered, Republican-tilting state such as Texas. 
 180. In the 2004 elections, no incumbents in California’s congressional delegation lost. See 
Charlie Cook, Why Are Most House Members Unbeatable?, 37 NAT’L J. 59, 59 (2005), available 
at http://www.cookpolitical.com/column/2004/010805.php (noting that, outside Texas, only three 
incumbents failed in their reelection bids—one each from Georgia, Illinois, and Indiana). Only 
two of fifty-three California congressional races were close by historical margins—that is, won 
with less than 55% of the vote. House Members Who Won with 55% or Less, COOK POL. REP., 
Dec. 6, 2004, available at http://www.cookpolitical.com/races/report_pdfs/2004_house_55_ 
dec6.pdf. 
 181. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 182. Id. at 328. 
 183. See id. at 330 (“[T]he coverage formula is rational in both practice and theory. It was 
therefore permissible to impose the new remedies . . . .”). 
 184. See id. at 330–31 (“It is irrelevant that the coverage formula excludes certain 
localities . . . for which there is evidence of voting discrimination by other means. . . . Legislation 
need not deal with all phases of a problem in the same way, so long as the distinctions drawn 
have some basis in practical experience.”). 
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individually,185 Congress’s ability to manipulate the implementation of 
the proposed reform by singling out certain states would be 
significantly constrained, assuming the present existence of a partisan 
gerrymander in any given redistricting cycle was in itself insufficient 
evidence of “a history and pattern of unconstitutional [state 
action].”186 If the lowered standards for Section 5 enforcement 
associated with fundamental rights are applicable in this context,187 
however, or if congressional finding of the existence of a partisan 
gerrymander sufficed to meet the documentary requirements, Boerne 
would not present an independent barrier to selective application of 
the reform, even though enacted with partisan, rather than reformist, 
intent. Moreover, if the legislation were constitutionally justified 
under one of the other bases for action discussed above, Boerne itself 
would simply be inapplicable. 
CONCLUSION 
Partisan gerrymandering inflicts significant political and 
constitutional harms on the voting public by decreasing 
representative responsiveness through diminished electoral 
competitiveness and by diluting the franchise for some voters because 
of their political affiliation. In some states, generally those with 
popular referendum mechanisms, these harms have been lessened or 
avoided through the adoption of independent redistricting 
commissions. These experiments with redistricting processes have 
provided several promising models for reducing partisan bias in 
redistricting outcomes without entirely sacrificing the benefits of a 
politically adversarial process. The spread of independent 
redistricting commissions to nonreferendum states is limited, 
however, by the very self-interested parties that the commissions seek 
to control: the state legislative majorities currently in control of the 
redistricting process. Moreover, the courts have largely refused to 
police effectively the actions of state legislatures in producing 
partisan gerrymanders, having failed, at least for the moment, to 
conceptualize the harms these district maps perpetrate against the 
 
 185. Justice Scalia has advocated this position in his dissents to decisions upholding 
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity under Section 5. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 
U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 
741–43 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 186. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001). 
 187. See supra Part III.C. 
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constitutional rights of individual voters in a way that provides a 
manageable standard for evaluating plaintiffs’ claims. In recognizing 
that such constitutional harms do exist, however, even if the courts 
cannot precisely describe them, the Supreme Court has opened the 
door for congressional action on a remedial or prophylactic basis. As 
this Note argues, Congress would be normatively and constitutionally 
justified in walking through that door by requiring states to adopt 
independent commissions as the primary mechanism for redistricting 
following the decennial census. Although no national political 
consensus now exists that would support passage of such legislation, 
congressional action of this nature may yet address the harms posed 
by partisan gerrymandering. 
